Fuel prices didn’t kill Spirit Airlines. Poor management did. – The Boston Globe
There were several moments over the past decade foretelling the demise of Spirit, the low-cost, cramped-seat, pay-for-everything-but-oxygen airline you loved to hate. Those moments had nothing to do with the recent spike in fuel prices and everything to do with an airline that lost its footing long ago.
Spirit officially and dramatically closed up shop on Saturday in a manner befitting its famously bad customer service. With speculation but no warning, Spirit called it quits, grounding its fleet of school-bus-yellow planes. There was no heads-up to ticket holders and no backup plan for its 14,000 employees. Just a press release about a vague “winding down.”
The airline filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection twice, in 2024 and again in 2025. That came along with layoffs, firings, and furloughs of its lauded flight attendants and pilots. Meanwhile, its notoriously bad customer satisfaction numbers remained as low as its prices. Just last month, a study from the American Customer Satisfaction Index ranked Spirit last, partly due to poor customer service and a clunky app.
Spirit could get by, even revel, in its bad customer service at one time, thanks to its ridiculously low prices. But as it did, the big boys of the industry that the airline once taunted took a page from Spirit’s playbook and introduced a concept called basic economy. You could now fly one of the legacy carriers, such as American, Delta, and United, at a low price, as long as you were willing to pay for extras, such as a carry-on or seat selection. All of this in seats that, unlike Spirit’s, actually recline in a jet that doesn’t resemble a poorly-appointed bus.
Meanwhile, a new crop of low-cost airlines, including Breeze and Avelo, moved in with a novel concept: focus on airports in smaller cities that are cheaper to fly out from, and draw away more Spirit customers.
Spirit’s response was a profit-crushing plan to expand its route network and fleet size. The big carriers derive a sizable portion of their profits from business-class tickets and business travelers, two markets that Spirit was unable to serve. It began offering what it called a Big Front Seat, but people looking for extra legroom were never going to turn to Spirit for comfort. Its reputation had been sealed years ago as an effective punchline among late-night comedians and real-life tales of how it refused to refund a dying veteran’s fare when he could no longer fly. After a public outcry, the airline finally refunded the vet.
Would anyone look to luxury from an airline whose CEO once responded to a customer complaint by saying, “We owe him nothing as far as I’m concerned. Let him tell the world how bad we are. He’s never flown us before anyway and will be back when we save him a penny”?
Remarkably, people continued to fly Spirit despite the airline’s rigid policies. A Senate report found that employees at Spirit (and Frontier) were incentivized to catch passengers trying to bring larger bags onto planes. Additionally, the word “refund” didn’t exist in the Spirit universe.
Spirit also faltered on its credit card offering. Airlines make millions with co-branded credit cards that offer their holders benefits such as free checked bags, upgrades, and free flights. It took the airline too long to start offering enough card benefits to make it worthwhile to customers.
All of this leads to the failed Spirit-JetBlue merger, which tanked Spirit’s stock, and to the lack of a government bailout last week, the final straw. Politicians are now pointing fingers as to who is to blame for Spirit’s demise. But what killed Spirit was a short-sighted vision. An airline that depends on mergers and bailouts to exist is bound to find itself grounded.
Christopher Muther can be reached at christopher.muther@globe.com. Follow him @Chris_Muther and Instagram @chris_muther.
